The open record said this was coming. A ship followed an authorised route. A drone hit it. Iran denied it. The AIS data did not.
This issue is about reading the signal before the incident report lands, and why the technique that would have flagged the Ever Lovely as a target is the same one most practitioners have never opened.
| 17 Jun | US and Iran sign a 60-day memorandum of understanding: best efforts, free passage | Official |
| 25 Jun | Morning: IRGC broadcasts on VHF Channel 16 that unauthorised transits are illegal | Record |
| 25 Jun | 14:00 UTC: Ever Lovely struck by a one-way attack drone; IRGC denies it the same day | Record |
| Fri | US aircraft strike Iranian missile and drone sites on the coastline | Official |
| Sat | Iranian drones hit Bahrain | Official |
4 vessels turned back by the IRGC broadcast before a weapon was fired | 6-12min before the position track, the heading field shows the reversal | 9of 54 vessels classed by Kpler as dark or unknown corridor after the strike |
A ceasefire both parties interpret differently is not a ceasefire. It is a documented precondition for the next incident.
The Ever Lovely had been trapped inside the Persian Gulf for over 100 days, loaded with cargo from Iraq and unable to leave. On 17 June, the US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding: 60 days, best efforts, free passage. The Ever Lovely moved. At 14:00 UTC on 25 June, 7.5 nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman, a one-way attack drone hit its starboard bridge superstructure. UKMTO confirmed the strike. All 21 crew were unharmed. The ship continued to Singapore. The IMO suspended its corridor for 11,000 stranded seafarers within the hour. US aircraft struck Iranian missile and drone sites on the Iranian coastline by Friday evening. Iranian drones hit Bahrain by Saturday morning.
| Vessel IMO 9629110, Evergreen Marine, Singapore-flagged |
| Strike 14:00 UTC, 25 June; vector: one-way attack drone, bridge superstructure |
| IRGC denial Same day, categorical |
| US confirmation Two officials to Reuters, anonymously |
| Escalation 36-hour escalation: US strikes on Iranian coastline, then Iranian drones on Bahrain |
Here is what the open record contained before the strike. On the morning of 25 June, hours before the Ever Lovely was hit, the IRGC broadcast on VHF Channel 16 from a tanker positioned inside the Gulf: vessels transiting the strait without Iranian authorisation were doing so illegally. The Ever Lovely was on the UKMTO-recommended southern Omani corridor, the route the IMO framework had designated as internationally authorised. It had not sought IRGC clearance. That decision was in the AIS record before the drone was airborne.
The MoU did not create a shared operational reality. It created a shared legal text. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister said "parallel routes cannot guarantee safety" on the same day the IMO announced its corridor. The IRGC told vessels the Omani route was unauthorised that same morning. The US said no one should pay to use international waters. Iran said it would charge tolls regardless. Two parties signed the same document and read different agreements in it. That incompatibility was public before the Ever Lovely left anchorage. A practitioner tracking this corridor had three open sources, UKMTO advisory feed, Iranian state media, the AIS position record, pointing at the same precondition. None required classified access.
Set a UKMTO advisory alert for the Strait of Hormuz. Free, near-real time, authoritative. Cross it daily against AIS corridor data for vessels of interest. If you are not running UKMTO as a background feed on any contested waterway, you are starting every investigation a day behind.
The practitioner question is not who fired the drone. It is: at what point in the preceding 24 hours did the open record contain sufficient signal to flag the Ever Lovely as a vessel at elevated risk? The answer is the morning of 25 June, before 09:00 UTC. The VHF broadcast is in the UKMTO advisory feed. The vessel's corridor choice is in AIS. The IRGC's stated position on unauthorised transits was in Iranian state media. Three sources, three layers, no classified access required. Reading the signal in advance of the incident rather than in retrospect is the work.