CENTCOM told X on 4 August that the southern route through the Strait of Hormuz is open to all commercial traffic. UKMTO's own incident log says that route absorbed sixteen of eighteen projectile strikes since 6 July, two more of them this week.
This is how to read a public advisory note against AIS behaviour and let the shipping industry's own conduct settle the disagreement.
| 28 Feb | Strait of Hormuz crisis begins | Record |
| 6 Jul | Start of the UKMTO tally: 16 of 18 projectile incidents since logged on the Southern Omani corridor | UKMTO |
| 19 Jul | JMIC update warns of continued operator caution on the corridor | UKMTO |
| 21 Jul | JMIC update names attacks on tankers in Omani waters as a driver of reduced traffic | UKMTO |
| 4 Aug | CENTCOM on X: route "remains open to all commercial vessels" | CENTCOM |
| 13 Aug | Two ADNOC vessels attacked in the Strait; UKMTO logs a separate drone strike | ADNOC |
| 14 Aug | UKMTO report: 56 vessel damage reports since 28 February | UKMTO |
16of 18 UKMTO-logged projectile incidents since 6 July hit the Southern Omani corridor | 56 vessel damage reports since 28 February (UKMTO, 14 August) | >50% of tankers crossing the Strait went AIS-dark in the past three weeks (Marisks) |
The route sold as the safe alternative took most of this month's strikes
The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company said two of its vessels were attacked while transiting the Strait of Hormuz on 13 August. UKMTO separately reported a vessel sustaining minor damage from a drone strike the same day. Both incidents occurred on the Southern Omani corridor, the alternative route promoted since the U.S. reimposed its naval blockade of Iranian ports, and both add to a tally that has been building since early July.
| Corridor Southern Omani route, promoted as the safer alternative to the Iranian-controlled channel |
| Strikes 16 of 18 UKMTO-logged projectile incidents since 6 July hit this corridor |
| Total damage 56 vessel damage reports since 28 February, per UKMTO's 14 August report, which had not yet folded in 13 August's attacks |
UKMTO's own JMIC Advisory Notes had already flagged the pattern in the open record weeks before this week's attacks. Its 19 July update warned of continued operator caution on the Southern Omani corridor tied to recent attacks there. Its 21 July update went further, naming recent attacks on tankers in Omani waters as a direct driver of reduced traffic on the route. Neither update required special access. Both are free PDFs published on UKMTO's own site.
At what point did the open record contain sufficient signal to flag the corridor itself as the risk. The answer is mid-July, when UKMTO's own biweekly notes began repeating the same warning about the same waters two updates running. A practitioner reading those PDFs against a running incident count would have flagged the corridor as the story before this week's ADNOC attacks made it one.
Open UKMTO's most recent JMIC Advisory Note at ukmto.org and note every incident logged against the Southern Omani corridor. Cross-check the dates against any live file that assumes the corridor is the safer option. A route with a rising incident count across two consecutive advisory notes is no longer the alternative. It is the story.
Six months into this crisis, the practitioner lesson is not about this corridor specifically. It is that a route's designation as "safer" is a label assigned once, at the start of a disruption, and rarely revisited against the incident data that route itself generates. The open record updates faster than the label does.
